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Abstract
People change the identifiers through which they are
reachable online as they change jobs or residences or
Internet service providers. This kind of personal mobil-
ity makes reaching people online error-prone. As people
move, they do not always know who or what has cached
their now obsolete identifiers so as to inform them of the
move. Use of these old identifiers can cause delivery fail-
ure of important messages, or worse, may cause delivery
of messages to unintended recipients. For example, a
sensitive email message sent to my now obsolete work
address at a former place of employment may reach my
unfriendly former boss instead of me.
In this paper we describe HINTS, a historic name-
trail service. This service provides a persistent way to
name willing participants online using today’s transient
online identifiers. HINTS accomplishes this by connect-
ing together the names a person uses along with the
times during which those names were valid for the per-
son, thus giving people control over the historic use of
their names. A correspondent who wishes to reach a
mobile person can use an obsolete online name for that
person, qualified with a time at which the online name
was successfully used; HINTS resolves this historic name
to a current valid online identifier for the intended re-
cipient, if that recipient has chosen to leave a name trail
in HINTS.
1 Introduction
The online world is inhabited by nomads. People
change their online names as they switch Internet
service providers (ISPs), either because they change
jobs and they use the ISP of their employer, or be-
cause they switch to a better, cheaper, or more con-
venient service for their personal ISP. As a result,
people accumulate a legacy of online identifiers that
are, in most cases, dangling pointers into obscurity,
making it hard to reach people.
Unfortunately, sometimes an obsolete online iden-
tifier does point to something, and this can be much
more dangerous than a dangling identifier. If the
obsolete identifier belongs to my previous personal
ISP, then some unrelated, unfortunate subscriber of
that same ISP is bothered by my legacy of spam. If
the obsolete identifier belongs to my previous place
of employment, it might allow my sensitive commu-
nications to reach a potentially disgruntled former
colleague or boss.
The problem stems from the simple fact that on-
line identifiers do not belong the people that they
name; they belong to the organization that manages
the associated name space. An employee of Sample
University does not own her Sample U. email ad-
dress; that address belongs to the university itself,
which loans it out to its employee for the duration
of her employment there. Similarly, my yahoo.com
address only names me as long as Yahoo! allows me
to use it and maintains its service. This is essentially
a mobility problem: a mobile person moves slowly
from identifier to identifier in a potentially-changing
landscape of online names over which he has lit-
tle control or authority. We call this the personal-
identity mobility problem.
The promise of unique personal identifiers as a
panacea for all kinds of identity mobility has been
made many times with dubious success. In some
cases, the proposed identification scheme requires a
retrofit of the entire communications infrastructure
of the Internet to work [12]. In other cases, the
“unique personal identifier” is just another identifier
assigned from a proprietary name space [6, 17, 18,
19].
In this paper we propose the HIstoric Name-
Trail Service (HINTS). In our naming scheme, cur-
rent online identifiers, email addresses and instant
messaging account names remain the primary iden-
tifiers that people use in everyday communications.
However, HINTS enables a person voluntarily to
build a trail that connects all the identifiers that
person uses over time into a single name history. A
correspondent can then safely name the person by
2using a potentially obsolete identifier qualified with
a time at which that identifier was successfully used
in the past. With this information the appropriate
name history for a unique person can be found and
followed to its latest entries, which provide a more
recent way to reach the sought person.
HINTS offers mobile people control over forward
pointers from their old to their current online iden-
tifiers. Even if an old name belongs in a name
space maintained by a now-defunct organization,
that name can still be resolved within HINTS to
a current identifier for its past owner. This inde-
pendence of a historical name from the provider of
its associated name space promotes a robust, persis-
tent way to refer to people, even when the practical
names we use in everyday life are neither robust,
unique nor persistent.
The goal of this paper is to introduce the con-
cept of historic naming as a means to address iden-
tity mobility, and to describe a simple version of
HINTS that can be deployed using today’s technol-
ogy. However, our current efforts focus on designing
and implementing a decentralized, more fault tol-
erant and secure version of HINTS, which we also
briefly describe in this paper.
We proceed by providing an abstract model of the
current personal online identification landscape, in
Section 2. In Section 3 we introduce the basic con-
cepts of HINTS, including the structure of the name
space, the functionality of the service, and the im-
plementation considerations involved. We evaluate
the benefits offered by HINTS in Section 4, by de-
lineating what the service can and cannot do, given
how personal online identification works today. We
then elaborate on the next step for HINTS, namely
security and fault-tolerance, we discuss what addi-
tional requirements these properties place on online
service providers, and we sketch an enhanced design
in Section 5, before we conclude.
2 A Model For Personal Online Iden-
tification
This section outlines the naming model on which
the historic name-trail service is based. This model
abstracts the way in which names are currently asso-
ciated with people online. We also describe the com-
ponents that currently provide naming services and
explain the division of control and naming respon-
sibilities between these services and their clients.
People need names online for a variety of pur-
poses, such as authentication, communication, and
authorization. In most cases, these names are sim-
ple, such as plain email addresses [20]. In other
cases, online names may be two-tiered, starting
with a primary application-unspecific name, which
is used to look up application-specific addresses in
a directory via a directory access protocol such as
LDAP [22]. For simplicity, we take the former ap-
proach in this paper. Specifically, we use email ad-
dresses as the primary names of people online in our
examples. However, the techniques we describe in
later sections apply directly and without change to
names in other applications, such as instant messag-
ing, or to two-tiered naming environments.
The names people use are drawn from a multi-
tude of independent name spaces. A name space
is a set of all possible names that are or can be
assigned by a single administrative entity, called a
name-space provider. For example, Yahoo! Inc. is
the name-space provider operating the yahoo.com
name space: this is the set of all possible ac-
count names for Yahoo! Inc.’s services, such as web
mail, instant messaging, calendaring, etc. In most
cases, the name-space provider responsible for a
name is easy to determine from the name itself.
For example, name@yahoo.com is a name in Ya-
hoo!’s name space. The computers responsible for
maintaining a name space are the name servers
of the provider. To find an authoritative name
server for a name space, we can access the Do-
main Name Service [15], either through a distinct
DNS resource record type, or through a straightfor-
ward name mapping (e.g., names.sample.edu for
the sample.edu name space).
A person online may be addressable via multiple
names drawn from different name spaces. For exam-
ple, one may be addressed using names assigned by
a school, by a personal Internet service provider, by
web services such as Yahoo! and Hotmail, and by
professional associations such as the ACM. These
names can be used for distinct or overlapping pur-
poses: professional, personal, commercial.
The association of a name with a person fol-
lows the regulations defined by the corresponding
name-space provider. These regulations may dic-
tate whether a name association is temporary or
permanent, whether a name may be reassigned af-
ter its previous association is discontinued and, if
so, the minimum amount of time between succes-
sive assignments of a single name. For example,
Sample University’s Computer Science Department
assigns names to its graduates for life, whereas ISPs
assign names to clients for the duration of the per-
tinent service agreement. It is important to note,
however, that the name-space provider is the ulti-
mate controller of the name space, regardless of the
3“promises” it makes to those using its names. It is
not uncommon, for example, that a claimed perma-
nent name assignment has had to change for legal,
social or political reasons. As an example experi-
enced by one of the authors at Sample University,
the arrival of a new faculty member who desired
an email address already assigned to a graduate re-
sulted in a reassignment of that email address to the
faculty member, in spite of the institution’s guaran-
tee of lifelong identifier assignments to its graduates.
In most cases today, a person exercises implicitly
his “stewardship” of a name assigned to him, by
being able to access the application for which the
name is assigned. For example, in today’s Internet,
if I can read and send email as name@yahoo.com,
then I am assumed to be the person to whom that
name has been assigned. Though not bulletproof,
this simplistic form of authentication is widely used
for signing up in mailing lists, for signing up for web
services or even for conducting business online. The
name-space provider can revoke an association be-
tween a person and his name by stopping that per-
son from accessing the named service; for example,
the provider can cancel the associated web email
account, or change the requisite password. Aside
from intra-enterprise settings, not many name-space
providers today offer rigorous security in how they
assign names, and how their clients assert ownership
on their names. Section 5 describes a more secure
naming model, very similar to an attribute certifi-
cation model, that allows us to address the problem
more comprehensively.
In the remainder of this paper, we limit mobile
person to be someone who wishes to remain reach-
able despite identifier changes. A correspondent per-
son is someone who wishes to reach a mobile person.
In the examples we use, Jane Mobile is a mobile per-
son, and Dan Friend is a correspondent of Jane’s.
3 A Historic Name-Trail Service
The primary goal of this work is to provide mo-
bile people with a forwarding service that is avail-
able to help them remain reachable despite their
identity mobility. We accomplish this by allow-
ing a mobile person to determine to what his his-
toric names—names qualified with a time when they
validly named that person—point. We approach
the problem first by taking the simplest path pos-
sible: a centralized, trusted service that operates
similarly to most web services currently deployed
and works with no cooperation from current infras-
tructure. We explore more sophisticated, secure and
fault-tolerant possibilities in Section 5.
Reachability despite identity mobility requires the
transfer of some of the naming “power” over a name
from the associated name-space provider to the per-
son to whom the provider assigns the name, within
closely guarded temporal confines. Specifically, even
though a provider can do anything it wishes to a
name, its actions cannot be applied retroactively:
if Yahoo! assigns jmobile@yahoo.com to Jane Mo-
bile from August 1999 to May 2000, it cannot later
“change history” so as to strip Jane of her con-
trol over jmobile@yahoo.com for the indicated time
period; Jane’s authority over jmobile@yahoo.com
from August 1999 to May 2000 is persistent.
By imposing this persistence of authority, HINTS
splits responsibilities between mobile people and
name-space providers. Name-space providers are
responsible for creating and destroying associations
between names and people (in fact, between names
and people who can access the service state for that
name). People are responsible for acting on behalf
of, and being reachable as a particular name during
the period that they have been assigned that name.
This separation of control enables the definition
of a “virtual” global persistent name space, with
most of the ambitious properties suggested in Iden-
tiScape [12], such as persistence, controllability and
human-centricity, but without requiring the cre-
ation and maintenance of a centralized name service
for a global, flat name space implied by that system.
3.1 The Name Space
We define the HINTS name space by extending
names with a continuous time designation. For
example, to refer to the person named by the
identifier jmobile@yahoo.com in March of 2000
we construct the identifier Historic[jmobile@yahoo.
com, 03/2000]. More generally, the HINTS name
space contains identifiers of the form Historic[name@
namespace, time]. A HINTS name corresponds to a
time-specific primary name, and is meaningful both
while the associated primary name is valid (i.e., as-
signed), and after that primary name has been re-
assigned or obsoleted by its name-space provider.
The time component of the identifier defines a
version of the chosen name space at a particular,
coarse-grained time. The time component may des-
ignate an entire year, a year and a month, or a
full date. Since identifiers change at “human” time
scales, refining the time component to anything
shorter than a day may be unnecessary. We as-
sume that clocks of clients or providers are at least
coarsely synchronized (e.g., they all agree on what
4day it is), but we address a more secure timing en-
vironment in Section 5.
Many different HINTS names may denote the
same person. Since Jane Mobile held the name
jmobile@yahoo.com from August 1999 to May
2000, any HINTS name that corresponds to the
same primary name and with a time designation
within the validity period points to her. For
example, Historic[jmobile@yahoo.com, 9/8/1999]
and Historic[jmobile@yahoo.com, 1/2000] are valid
HINTS names for Jane Mobile.
Some HINTS names denote multiple people. Con-
sider the scenario in which Yahoo! Inc. reassigned
the name jmobile@yahoo.com to a different person,
James Mobilewski, in September of 2000. Then the
HINTS name Historic[jmobile@yahoo.com, 2000] is
multivalent, in the sense that it points to two differ-
ent people, Jane Mobile and James Mobilewski. A
multivalent HINTS name is essentially a list name,
since it names all of the possible people to whom
the included primary name points during the time
designation of the historic name. Therefore, historic
names with narrow time designations are preferable
to those with very broad time designations, when
possible.
3.2 A Personal Naming History
HINTS relies on a name history to resolve historic
names. A name history links together HINTS names
that refer to the same person. The objective behind
maintaining a name history is to be able to reach a
currently valid name-to-person association, starting
with a now obsolete one. In the Jane Mobile exam-
ple, the goal is to be able to obtain name janem@
hotmail.com, which is currently valid and is held
by Jane, starting with Historic[jmobile@yahoo.com,
03/2002], even though jmobile@yahoo.com is no
longer held by Jane. Figure 1 shows an example
name history for Jane Mobile.
A name history is maintained as a sequence of
historic records pertaining to a single name within
a single name space, such as jmobile@yahoo.com.
An online entity called a name historian maintains
these records. The history of a name is modified due
to either assignment changes or linking changes.
Changes in assignment affect to whom a partic-
ular name points. These are effected in provider-
specific ways, such as changes in the password
needed to receive service under a particular name,
etc. Assignment changes can be detected by the
name historian either directly, through an explicit
notification from the name-space provider, or indi-
rectly, through failure of a mobile person to respond
8/1/1999 5/25/2000
7/2/2000
jmobile@
yahoo.com
janem@
hotmail.com
1/3/2002
jane@
sample.edu
10/1/2001
Assignment
Figure 1: Jane’s name history. Each of the three names
shown has been held by Jane at some point in time. For
each name, the thick gray line represents the time pe-
riod during which Jane was assigned that name by Ya-
hoo!. For example, Jane held janem@hotmail.com be-
tween July 2000 and October 2001.
to a challenge issued to his formerly assigned name.
Since in this design we assume no cooperation from
name-space providers, only indirect detection of as-
signment changes is possible. However, the histo-
rian can initiate indirect detections of assignment
changes reactively, at the request of a mobile per-
son.
Changes in linking affect how a single person as-
sumes different online names over time. The his-
torian emulates the concept of a “person” online
by maintaining a trail of “personal manifestations”,
such as knowledge of the same secret password or
of the secret portion of the same cryptographic key
pair. Linking represents the intention of such an on-
line person to be or not to be named by particular
online names. The mobile person requests explicitly
to be linked to or unlinked from a name by contact-
ing the name historian with the appropriate request.
Assignments and links must both support the as-
sociation of an online name with the historian’s on-
line representation of a mobile person. Specifically,
to accept such an association, the historian must
establish two facts: first that the mobile person
wishes to assume that name, as communicated di-
rectly to the historian via a linking request; and,
second, that the online person has access to that
name, which the historian can detect indirectly by
sending a challenge to that name via email (or any
other applicable protocol) and expecting an appro-
priate response.
The historian periodically reestablishes both as-
signment and linking for an association. Since the
name-space providers are not aware of the service,
the historian has no recourse but to poll the name
5AssociationRecord{
Name : jmobile@yahoo.com
Person : Jane Mobile
Start Time : March 2, 2000
End Time : May 1, 2000
Expiration Time : July 1, 2000
Next Link : June 29, 2000
Next Assign : June 29, 2000
}
Figure 2: An association record representing the as-
sociation between Jane Mobile and the name jmobile@
yahoo.com from March 2 to May 1 of 2000. The his-
torian considers the association valid until July 1 and
expects a reconfirmation thereof on June 29. If that
confirmation does not arrive, the association record is
archived as ending on May 1st. Otherwise, the associa-
tion record remains active, pushing its end time to July
1st and its expiration time 2 months later. The dura-
tion of the time-to-live period of 2 months is arbitrarily
chosen here and can be modified per name space, per
person, or per name historian.
space periodically or in response to user requests, so
as to establish whether the assumed mobile person
still has control of his former name. Similarly, to
avoid cases where a mobile person who becomes un-
available is assumed to be asserting control over a
name by default for extended time periods, the his-
torian expects periodically that person to reassert
his links actively.
Figure 2 illustrates an association record, the ba-
sic building block of a historic name database. The
specific record identifies Jane Mobile using her first
and last names, although in practice a person is
identified by the historian using an internal, pri-
vate, implementation-specific name space for mo-
bile person identification that no correspondent ever
sees. An association record is active if it covers the
present time (that is, its expiration time is in the
future). An expired association record is archived
and becomes immutable.
Figure 3 illustrates some of the historic associa-
tions that the name historian maintains for Jane.
As shown in Figure 1, the name-space provider for
jmobile@yahoo.com unassigns the name from Jane
on May 25, 2000. As a result, even though Jane
wishes to retain the name, as evidenced by the
link extension she requested to July 1st, the histo-
rian stores an archived association record that only
extends up to the last time both the name-space
provider and Jane agreed on the association, May
1, 2000.
8/1/1999 5/25/2000
7/2/2000
jmobile@
yahoo.com
janem@
hotmail.com
Jane Mobile
AssignmentLink
Figure 3: The names jmobile@yahoo.com and janem@
hotmail.com are linked to the historian’s account for
Jane Mobile (dashed line in the middle). The gray line
segment covers associations that the historian has ac-
cepted.
3.3 The Name Historian
In this section, we delineate the functionality avail-
able to users of HINTS. In particular, we describe
the interface to the name historian itself, its design
and some implementation details.
The primary objective of any name service is to
support name resolution: given a personal identi-
fier, the service must return a “pointer” to the iden-
tified person. In the HINTS context, this means
that HINTS names must be resolved to primary
names, such as email addresses. If Dan Sender
wishes to send email to Jane Mobile, he must first
resolve the HINTS name with which he previously
reached her successfully (Historic[jmobile@yahoo.
com, 03/2000]) to a currently valid primary name
(jane@sample.edu). Keeping track of the last time
an email address was used successfully is arguably
functionality that current email clients can easily
offer, and is very similar in complexity to keeping
track, for example, of the last time a web URL
was used, which most web browsers do transpar-
ently by default. Alternatively, correspondents can
remember an approximate time period when they
contacted a mobile person and construct a historic
name accordingly, perhaps by referring to saved cor-
respondence with the mobile person and extracting
dates from that correspondence.
The name historian runs a centralized, trusted
service maintaining name histories. The historian
is trusted to check the validity of the name histories
it stores and to report on those histories when asked.
Given the naming model we assume in this design
(see Section 2), the historian is a powerful compo-
nent in the network. In Section 4 we examine the
6shortcomings of having such a centralized design,
and we propose alternatives in Section 5, based on
stronger assumptions about name-space providers.
The historian operates a name space itself, con-
sisting of the account names of its users. This name
space, however, is only used to authenticate mobile
people to the historian and need not be visible ex-
ternally to the service. The historian manages its
own name space similarly to how most web services
manage their account name spaces: a client (mo-
bile person in this case) signs up online and receives
an account and a means of authentication, such as
a password or an asymmetric key pair, for future
exchanges with the historian.
To accomplish the task of resolution, the historian
must also be able to receive link requests from mo-
bile people as described in the previous section, and
send and verify challenges to the holders of primary
names to detect name assignment changes.
HINTS can help correspondents who must rely
on their own memory to construct a resolution re-
quest by presenting them with a history of name
associations for the same name. For example, Dan
Friend remembers having contacted Jane in the late
90’s, but that is as specific a time frame as he can
recall. If he can find out that jmobile@yahoo.com
belonged to someone from 1995 to 2000, and then to
someone else from 2000 to 2002, then Dan can rea-
sonably choose Historic[jmobile@yahoo.com, 1999]
to locate Jane Mobile.
In summary, the history service must be able to
perform the following tasks:
• Create mobile person accounts.
• Request link changes (linking and unlinking)
between a mobile person account and a primary
name.
• Resolve a historic name to a currently assigned
primary name.
• Retrieve a list of association periods for a pri-
mary name.
The historian maintains a database of associa-
tion records, as described in the previous section.
The database maintains two sorted indices, one on
[name, start time] and another on [person, start
time].
When a mobile person requests to be linked to a
name, the historian contacts that name with a ran-
dom number as a challenge, by email or any other
applicable protocol. If the email is returned with
the appropriate response to the challenge, then the
historian considers the name assigned to the mobile
person and creates a new association record. Algo-
rithm 1 details this process.
Algorithm 1: Link mobile person A to name a@A. H
is the historian, M is the mobile person, now is the
current time (on the historian’s clock) and l is the
maximum validity period of a link. M is assumed to
have logged in as A. ⇒ denotes a network message.
← denotes assignment. The process executes on H .
1: H ⇐M : Link A to a@A
2: N ← random nonce
3: H ⇒a@A: Request confirmation of assignment to
A with nonce N
4: H ⇐ M : Assignment confirmation of a@A to A
with nonce N
5: if confirmation is negative or none arrives then
6: Do nothing and exit
7: L ← the association records where name is a@A
and person is A with the greatest start time
8: if none is found then
9: Store into database [Association a@A, A, now ,
now , now + l, now + l, now + l] {format is
name, person, start, end, expiration, next link,
next assignment}
10: else
11: if ExpirationTime(L) < now then
12: Store into database [Association a@A, A,
now , now , now + l, now + l, now + l]
13: else
14: Update into database record L to [Associa-
tion a@A, A, StartTime(L), now , now + l,
now + l, now + l]
Links are severed in a similar manner, although
no confirmation from the associated primary name
is necessary; the reason for severing a link is exactly
that the associated primary name is no longer under
the control of the mobile person and, as a result, a
confirmation from the primary name might not even
be possible. However, a notification is sent to the
primary name, to make it harder for an unautho-
rized user of the historian account to make changes
unobtrusively. Algorithm 2 describes the process in
more detail.
Correspondents query the historian for resolved
historic names in a simple request-response proto-
col. The historian resolves a historic name by, first
mapping it to an internal account and then finding
the latest still-valid association from that account
to a primary name. Algorithm 3 has the details.
Listing association periods for a name is a
straightforward operation helped by the database
indices maintained.
7Algorithm 2: Sever the link from the historian ac-
count A to name a@A. H is the historian and M is
the mobile person, logged in as A.
1: H ⇐M : Sever a@A from A
2: H ⇒ a@A: Notification of link severance from A
3: L ← the association record where name is a@A,
person is A with the greatest start time
4: if ExpirationTime(L) > now then
5: Update into database record L to [Association
a@A, A, StartTime(L), now , now , now , now ]
Algorithm 3: Resolve historic name Historic[a@A, t]
to primary name b@B if possible, or return failure
otherwise. This is run on the historian H .
1: L ← the association record where name is a@A
and the start time s is the highest such that s ≤ t
2: if no record is found then
3: Return no results
4: L′ ← the association record where person is
Person(L) and the end time is greater than now
5: if no record is found then
6: Return no results
7: Return Name(L′)
4 Discussion
The name historian we describe in Section 3 achieves
the primary goal of this work, reachability in the
face of identity mobility. HINTS accomplishes this
without the need for brand new globally visible,
unique, persistent identifiers for every mobile per-
son. Furthermore, it requires no retrofitting of cur-
rent name-space providers’ practices, requires no co-
operation whatever from those providers, and can
be deployed incrementally.
Unfortunately, the simple centralized approach
we take here has some shortcomings that can be-
come significant as an increasing fraction of the
world’s business and fraud are transacted online.
First, it relies on the honesty of the organization
that operates the name historian. A centralized,
centrally operated historian is a single point of fail-
ure, for failures including corruption, malfunction,
connectivity disruption or going out of business.
Second, the scheme offers no tangible assurances for
the correctness of the information it gives out. For
example, when a correspondent receives a primary
name in response to a resolution request, he has to
take the answer on faith; he has to believe that the
historian did not invent the association and that the
historian checked the validity of the association (i.e.,
issued a challenge to the claimed primary name and
received a satisfactory response). Third, the scheme
is only useful to those correspondents and mobile
people who trust the historian. If no single historian
is globally trusted, then there is no straightforward
way to allow any correspondent to reach any mobile
person.
Another issue that can potentially affect the util-
ity of HINTS is its reliance on the correspondents’
knowledge of past names for a mobile person. If I
never knew Jane Mobile before, there is no historic
name that I can use to resolve Jane’s current contact
information. HINTS is not intended as a search en-
gine for finding contact information for people I have
never attempted to reach before. We believe that
web search engines and currently deployed lookup
services such as WhoWhere [11] are more appropri-
ate for that purpose. However, old contact informa-
tion gathered from such a web search becomes more
valuable with HINTS, since it can then potentially
be resolved to current contact information.
A third issue that affects the potential success of
HINTS is concern for the privacy of individuals. En-
tering identifiers into a HINTS name trail is volun-
tary; if a person wants obsolete identifiers to remain
so, they need not tell HINTS about those identifiers.
However, mobile people need to be aware that there
is a risk that messages sent by correspondents to
those old identifiers may reach someone else who
now has control over that old identifier. If those
messages are potentially sensitive, then mobile peo-
ple may desire to see a widespread use of HINTS.
Furthermore, we believe that identifiers inevitably
“leak out” to the outside world. True protection
from spam and other threats is better performed us-
ing other techniques, such as the use of a personal
communications proxy through which all incoming
communications may be filtered [21].
In the next section, we sketch an enhanced name
historian design that offers the same functionality
as what we present in earlier sections, but also alle-
viates the security and fault-tolerance concerns ad-
dressed above. We are currently focusing our design
and implementation efforts on this stronger version
of HINTS.
5 A Secure Name Historian
We believe that the increasing need for online se-
curity, the rising cost of identity theft and spoofing
and the evolving standardization projects for secure
directory access will soon change how name-space
providers do naming. We expect that providers will
8act much more like cooperative but competing certi-
fication authorities in the future; in fact, most large
enterprises and even some governments [4] do per-
form naming or digital certification within their own
realms in this more secure fashion.
Furthermore, we believe that unconditional trust
in any centralized service is going to be increasingly
difficult to digest for security-conscious mobile peo-
ple.
In this section we enhance our earlier design for
a historic name-trail service to address two major
concerns: First we use cryptography to prevent il-
legitimate changes in name-to-person associations,
as can be caused by IP and email address spoofing,
and eavesdropping on unsecured email. Second, we
relax the need for trusting the name historian un-
conditionally, by employing secure time stamping [9]
and undeniable attestation techniques [2], to limit
the amount of unobtrusive damage a corrupt histo-
rian can cause to its clients’ name histories.
We start by describing the stronger and slightly
more cooperative name-space providers we need for
this enhanced design, and then outline how our ear-
lier concerns can be addressed.
5.1 Certification Authorities As Name-
Space Providers
A certification authority is not much more than a
name-space provider that accompanies the assign-
ment of a name to a person with the issuance of a
signed statement called an identity certificate, such
as the one shown in Figure 4. Note that Jane Mo-
bile is not mentioned explicitly in the certificate.
Instead, the provider assigns the name to the per-
son who knows the secret portion of the public key
AB34D9..., after having established that Jane Mo-
bile holds that key. The kind of identity verification
performed before a name-space provider assigns a
name to a person’s public key is provider-specific
and out of scope in this paper.
The name-space provider can revoke an assign-
ment by publishing a revocation certificate, such as
that shown in Figure 5, or by publishing another
identity certificate for the same name but a differ-
ent public key.
Finally, the name-space provider refreshes an as-
signment by issuing new identity certificates for the
same name and key before the previous assignment
expires.
Besides this basic certification functionality, in
this environment of higher security awareness we
assume that name-space providers are cooperative
with the history service, in the sense that they no-
IdentityCertificate{
Issuer : yahoo.com
Subject : jmobile
Key : AB34D9...
Start Time : August 1, 1999,
End Time : July 31, 2001,
Nonce : 2C08A3...
Signature : <Issuer, subject, key,
times and nonce signed
using yahoo.com’s
private key>
}
Figure 4: The identity certificate that links the name
jmobile@yahoo.com to the public key AB34D9....
RevocationCertificate{
Issuer : yahoo.com
Subject : jmobile
Key : AB34D9...
Start Time : May 25, 2000,
Nonce : 69C802...
Signature : <Issuer, subject, key,
start time and nonce
signed using yahoo.com’s
private key>
}
Figure 5: The revocation certificate that breaks the link
between the name jmobile@yahoo.com and the public
key AB34D9....
9tify the historian of name assignment changes by
conveying to the historian newly issued identity or
revocation certificates. For replay protection, we
also assume that each such certificate issued by a
name-space provider contains a nonce value, which
in the simplest case is the time of issuance, but can
also be a random number picked as a freshness chal-
lenge.
5.2 Certified Historic Naming
One straightforward way to address this harder
naming problem is to make all information that the
historian maintains signed, so as to prevent illegit-
imate modifications. To make sure that a corrupt
historian cannot divert a name trail by changing to
what historian user accounts point, mobile people
are represented in name histories by their signing
key pairs, called person keys, similarly to the ap-
proach taken in SPKI/SDSI [7]. In this manner,
the online representation of a person becomes “the
person who knows the secret signing key”.
Name assignments can be naturally represented
with the identity and revocation certificates that
name-space providers issue. Linking can be repre-
sented with similar link and severance certificates
(see Figures 6 and 7, respectively), signed by mo-
bile people (i.e., the holders of historian accounts)
who lay claim on different primary names. Instead
of storing a single association record per primary-
name-to-mobile-person association, the historian
stores all signed certificates delineating the assign-
ment and the linking time periods that make up an
association.
The historian can perform the same tasks as those
in Section 3.3 with only little more difficulty. For
example, to resolve a historic name, the historian
must find an association from the historic name to
a mobile person and then back from the mobile per-
son to a currently valid name association, as detailed
in Algorithm 3. Instead of just locating an associa-
tion record, the historian must find the appropriate
certificates justifying the association from the given
historic name to a person and back to another pri-
mary name; not only does the historian have to re-
turn the answer it found—a primary name or a neg-
ative answer—but it must also return a proof, the
set of certificates that support its response. The cor-
respondent must then check that all the statements
are signed correctly, and that they in fact do support
a valid resolution, regardless of whether the answer
was a primary name or a name-not-found response.
Unfortunately, there are three major issues that
face clients of such a name historian: the short
LinkCertificate{
Name : jmobile@yahoo.com
Person Key : E51BB2...
Start Time : March 2, 2000,
End Time : May 1, 2000,
Nonce : 6FC3F0...
Signature 1: <Name, Person Key,
Times and Nonce
signed by the current
key of the name>
Signature 2: <Name, Person Key,
Times and Nonce
signed by the current
key of the historian
account>
}
Figure 6: A link certificate associating name jmobile@
yahoo.com with the person currently represented by key
E51BB2... on 3/2/2000.
SeveranceCertificate{
Name : jmobile@yahoo.com
Person Key : E51BB2...
Time : April 25, 2000,
Nonce : EE3BF4...
Signature : <Name, Person Key,
Time and Nonce
signed by the
person key>
}
Figure 7: A severance certificate breaking the link
between the person currently represented by the key
E51BB2... and jmobile@yahoo.com on April 25, 2000.
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DelegationCertificate{
Issuer : E51BB2...
Delegate : D91452...
Time : June 1, 2001
Nonce : D8306A...
Signature : <Issuer, Delegate, Time
and Nonce signed using
both issuing and delegate
keys>
}
Figure 8: A delegation certificate, making the delegate
key a continuation of the key trail of the issuing key.
lifetime of digital signatures, the need for tempo-
ral ordering of historic records, and the need for a
“closed”, append-only historic database. We elabo-
rate on all three in turn.
First, digital signatures have a limited lifetime.
How does one make sure that a statement signed a
few years back was correctly signed at the time, even
though the signing key may have by now expired?
Some work has been done to make signed documents
usable even after the pertinent signing key has ex-
pired [8, 13]. In any case, the client must either
trust the name-space providers themselves to main-
tain historic records of when they used what public
key pair to sign their issued statements, or trust an
external authority, such as the KASTS Key Archival
Service [13], to maintain these records. Briefly, this
service maintains a securely time stamped archive
of the keys that different name-space providers use
during their lifetimes, along with the times when
those keys were used. A client who wishes to verify
a signed statement, including the certificates we de-
scribe above, can look up the name of the provider
and the appropriate time period. The returned key
can be then used to verify the signature on the state-
ment. However, it is important to also ascertain
that the statement was signed while the key found
was still valid (i.e., before it expired or was revoked).
The ephemeral nature of digital signatures and
signing keys also makes it hard to maintain the on-
line representation of mobile people when the histo-
rian is not fully trusted, since mobile people must
change the public keys that represent them regu-
larly. People do this by issuing and submitting del-
egation certificates to the historian (see Figure 8,
delegating their “personhood” from older keys to
newer ones. Again, timing is of the essence, since
a delegation must be performed before the previ-
ous key has to be abandoned, due to expiration or
compromise.
Second, any secure historic database must in-
corporate timing information on when its different
records were archived. This is necessary for archived
signatures, as described in the previous paragraphs,
but also for authorization purposes, in key delega-
tions or associations. For example, given a historic
name, to establish the appropriate name associa-
tion from assignment and linking certificates one
must have knowledge of the relative temporal order-
ing of the issuance of those certificates. It must be
shown that the historic name designates a time after
an identity certificate and a linking statement cre-
ated an association between the pertinent name and
mobile person, but before those certificates expire
or any potential revocation or unlinking statements
came in effect. Relative temporal authentication of
certificates in centralized [3] and decentralized [14]
certificate archives can be invaluable here.
Briefly, relative temporal authentication uses one-
way, collision-resistant hash functions, such as SHA-
1 [16], to define the temporal ordering from ear-
lier historic records to later ones. In a sense, a
tamper-evident linked list is created from all his-
toric records, so that earlier records appear ear-
lier in the list. Then regularly picked placeholder
records from the list are published in a widely wit-
nessed, secure, write-once publication medium, such
as a high-circulation newspaper; a verifier who cares
about when a particular record was appended into
the historic database can trace the linked list back-
wards and forwards to find the previous and next,
respectively, list links published in the newspaper,
which in turn places the record in question in a
rough time frame, that is, between the publica-
tion dates of two newspaper issues in the newspa-
per example. The collision-resistance and one-way
property of the hash function used to link records
together guarantees that once a record has been
placed in the historic database and the next link
from the database has been “committed” on a news-
paper, neither the maintainer of the database nor
anyone else can tamper with the past, changing
when records appear to have been incorporated,
adding or removing records, or modifying the con-
tents of those records. This is the basic mechanism
behind secure time stamping [9].
Third, it is important that the historian be un-
able to “forget” historic records that it has success-
fully accepted when they were submitted to it. For
example, if a name-space provider submits a revo-
cation certificate to the historian and the historian
accepts it, it should be unable to deny the existence
of such a revocation certificate convincingly when
queried later. Undeniable attestation [2] is a cryp-
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tographic construct that allows clients to verify the
historian’s claimed existence or non-existence of cer-
tain records. The basic idea there is to construct a
sorted data structure that allows undeniable attes-
tations on its contents, that is, proofs that a par-
ticular element belongs or does not belong to the
data structure. In the secure HINTS design, the
database indices are, in fact, undeniable attesters.
An essential requirement is that attestation
proofs are significantly shorter in size than the en-
tire data structure itself. Consider, for example,
a historic name database that holds a few billion
certificates for many names and many mobile peo-
ple. It would be extremely unrealistic to have to
look through every single record in such a large
database before being able to conclude no interest-
ing revocation certificate has been archived there.
The constructs from the work by Buldas et al. [2]
and Maniatis and Baker [14] offer attestations with
sizes logarithmic in the number of records stored,
which, for extremely optimistic lifetime and popu-
larity projections for a service like HINTS, never
exceed roughly 20 KBytes; this is quite an accept-
able size for records one expects to receive over the
network once or twice a day.
5.3 Status
The reduced-trust version of the HINTS design,
and a further completely decentralized HINTS,
are still under active development. Although we
have already designed—or implemented from ex-
isted designs—the tools and techniques we describe
in the previous section, we have yet to deploy and
quantify the implementation of this more secure
HINTS system.
6 Related Work
The literature regarding naming in distributed sys-
tems is vast, so in this section we confine ourselves
to a sampling of systems and products that attempt
to provide online names specifically for people.
An early design of a global name service [10] de-
scribes how a global hierarchical name space can be
implemented across a distributed set of computing
resources. Our approach is in a sense the opposite:
we assume there are reasons for many separate name
spaces to exist, and that people’s online identifiers
will move from one such name space to another. It
is this identity mobility we address.
The new Internet domain names ending with
.name are intended to provide a flat global name
space for individuals that is not associated with
particular employers and institutions. These names
could indeed function as the primary names in our
naming scheme. However, there are still many rea-
sons why registrants for these names may end up
changing their online identifiers in any case. Peo-
ple who fail to pay their bills may lose access to
their .name identifiers. People who change personal
names, such as when getting married or taking stage
names, may want to reflect this by changing their
online identifiers as well. Moreover, these online
identifiers may not be the only online identifiers reg-
istrants use. A user of a .name identity may also
have email service through an employer, and it is
hard to prevent identifiers from these other name
spaces from ”leaking out” in such a way that corre-
spondents will not attempt to use them after they
become obsolete.
IdentiScape [13] describes a flat global name space
for people, in which identifiers do not necessarily re-
flect their personal names but instead can be a set of
space-separated words in unicode. The hope is that
this name space is large enough to accommodate
many names per person, for everyone in the world,
for the next one hundred years. In the back end,
IdentiScape maintains identity objects, which are
repositories of access-controlled personal informa-
tion, such as application-specific addresses, credit
card numbers and user-specific attributes. In the
model of Section 2, IdentiScape is a two-tiered nam-
ing scheme. The authors of IdentiScape list identi-
fier persistence as one of the desired traits of on-
line identifiers, but there is nothing to suggest that
users will not change names within the IdentiScape
name space or use identifiers from other name spaces
as well, leaving identity mobility issues unsolved in
IdentiScape.
CommonName [6] is one of many online redirec-
tion services (others are OneName [18] and Novell’s
DigitalMe [17]). CommonName allows the use of
common names or phrases instead of URLs or email
addresses. It also allows the owner of a common
name to set up different redirection schedules, for
example, the CommonName “Jane Mobile” is redi-
rected to Jane’s personal email address during the
weekend but to her work email address on a week-
day. Further personalization is possible, such as
maintaining globally accessible bookmarks, notes,
etc. CommonName provides plug-ins for popular
email applications and web browsers. A common
name is first assigned according to availability, but
then checked by a human for “appropriateness”.
Common names must be “appropriate and relevant
to [the] subscribers’ web and e-mail resources.”
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A CommonName is assigned to an account for the
duration of the account or the service:
CommonName is committed to providing
this service free of charge for as long as it
is commercially viable for it to do so.
However, once an account is discontinued, its Com-
monName can be reassigned [1].
PingID [19] is very similar to IdentiScape [13].
An identity server, privately held by an owner of an
identity, is responsible for authorizing (or not) the
release of information according to whomever is ask-
ing. The business goals cover the usual applications:
single sign-on, password management, privacy man-
agement. PingID does not address identity mobil-
ity, in that it does not allow reverse lookups from
obsolete primary names to its own name space.
Classmates.com [5] is a service that allows people
to register the school or college they attended, the
military base at which they served, or the company
for which they worked. This allows people who, for
example, attended the same class at the same school
to reconnect in the future. HINTS has very similar
goals to this venture. We also seek to map a mobile
person’s presence in the past to a current contact;
however, we take a purely online and more general
approach, in that a correspondent need not know
anything more than the mobile person’s identifier
used in the past, rather than first and last names
and a class year. This makes it easier for email and
other applications to run identifiers through HINTS
automatically, perhaps every time they are used,
to make sure the most recent identifier is accessed,
although it limits the amount of heuristic weeding
one can do on likely candidate names. In addition,
HINTS provides a trail of past identifiers, allowing
correspondents throughout a recipient’s history of
identifiers to contact the recipient, even if the corre-
spondents did not know the recipient when he grad-
uated from Sample University in 1957.
7 Conclusion
The extremely volatile environment typical to on-
line services and their users makes identifier changes
and the commensurate management problems a
painful fact of online life. In this paper, we address
the problem of identity mobility, by extending the
names people commonly use in today’s applications
with a designation of a time when those names were
successfully used.
We present a simple design for HINTS, a his-
toric name-trail service, that allows mobile people to
record and make available their movements through
the “identifier landscape”. Correspondents can fol-
low those name trails from where a person has been
(i.e., a name she used to have) to where that person
is (i.e., a name she uses now). In this way, a cor-
respondent can resolve a temporally qualified name
into a name that is valid now; he can use that name
to reach a mobile person whom he has not contacted
in a long time, avoiding names that point to no one
and reassigned names that point to the wrong per-
son.
Finally, we describe how security can enhance
HINTS in the increasingly naughty Internet to pre-
vent illegitimate use of historic names and name-
history corruption by a malicious service itself. We
outline a design for such an enhanced HINTS sys-
tem, which we hope to evaluate and make available
soon.
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